A multiple secret sharing scheme can share a group of secrets in each sharing session; this scheme is deemed to be very useful in sharing important secrets. However, previously, no scheme on sharing points on an elliptic curve has been devised. In responding to the problem, this paper proposes a new (t, n) multi-point sharing scheme using self-pairing on an elliptic curve. The security of the proposed scheme was examined. Towards the end of the study, the researchers concluded that the new scheme was computationally secure if at least n − t + 1 users in the scheme are honest, and if O(lg q) points at most are shared. Therefore, the threshold digital signature scheme on an elliptic curve can be designed and implemented easily.
Introduction
Secret sharing protects important information from being lost, destroyed, or going into the wrong hands. Over time, there have been a number of schemes of secret sharing, the first of which is the (t, n) threshold scheme by Shamir [1] and Blakley [2] , independently and respectively. In the threshold scheme, a secret can be shared among n participants. At least t or more participants can pool their secret shadows and reconstruct the secret easily; however, any t − 1 or fewer secret shadows cannot obtain anything about the secret. To share another secret, the secret dealer must redistribute every participant's secret shadow.
Since the introduction of the threshold scheme, secret sharing technology has received considerable attention and has been developed extensively because of its applications in several fields including data security, key assignment, and secure computation [3] , among others. For an extensive survey and discussion of the main results in this area, please refer to [4, 5] .
Later, a new type of sharing scheme was proposed; it was called multiple secret sharing scheme, in which multiple secrets need to be shared during one secret sharing session [6] . Recently, several schemes have been proposed for multiple secret sharing [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . Common to all these schemes is that every participant needs to keep only one shadow but can share many secrets independently and without refreshing the shadow. To reconstruct a secret, each participant needs to submit a pseudo shadow computed from the real shadow instead of the real shadow itself. The reconstruction of one secret cannot compromise the secrecy of the remaining secrets that are not reconstructed. The schemes are useful for several kinds of applications. Sometimes, several secrets should be protected with about the same amount of data needed to protect one secret. Moreover, sometimes people need to divide up one large secret into multi-pieces, with each piece protected by a smaller amount of data than the case in which one needs to protect the entire large secret.
However, no scheme on sharing points on an elliptic curve had ever been devised prior to this study, which proposed a secure scheme on sharing points on elliptic curves. The proponents also proved that the new scheme was computationally secure if at least n − t + 1 users in the scheme are honest, and if O(lg q) points at most are shared. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a brief review of the basic concepts of the elliptic curve and self-pairing on an elliptic curve. Section 3 presents the new scheme of points sharing. Section 4 presents the analyses of the new scheme. The last part, Section 5, provides the conclusions based on the findings.
Elliptic curve and self-pairing

Elliptic curve
Elliptic curve cryptography was first proposed by Koblitz [12] and Miller [13] . Recently, elliptic curve cryptosystems have been the focus of much attention because they have many advantages like a short key length and fast computation speed.
An elliptic curve defined over GF(q) is given by the equation as follows:
The points on the curve (plus an infinite point O) form a finite Abelian group:
Saying so, the following assumptions about the difficult problems in an elliptic curve were made owing to their significance in the security analysis of the scheme proposed by this study: Assumption 1. Given an elliptic curve E defined over the finite field GF(q) and two points P and Q on E(GF(q)), there exists no polynomial time algorithm (on lg q) deciding the integer k such that kP = Q if such a k exists.
The second assumption is not as well known as Assumption 1; however, the second assumption is important in proving the theorems in the fourth section of the paper. Assumption 2. Given an elliptic curve E defined over the finite field GF(q) and O(lg q) points Q i on E(GF(q)). There exists no polynomial time algorithm (on lg q) deciding the integers
Remark 1. Assumption 2 is reasonable because otherwise, the Index-Calculus method [14] can be implemented efficiently on an elliptic curve to solve the elliptic curve discrete logarithm (ECDLP, for short), which is believed to be hopeless [13, 15] .
Bilinear self-pairing
In this subsection, we will give a description of the bilinear self-pairing proposed in [16] . Let K be a field with characteristic zero or a prime p and E = E(K) an elliptic curve over K, where K is an algebraic closure of K. E is a torsion group if for each point P ∈ E, there is a positive integer l such that lP = O. The smallest such integer is called the order of P. An l-torsion point is a point P ∈ E(K) satisfying lP = O. Let E(K) [l] denote the subgroup of l-torsion points in E(K) where l = 0; thus, E[l] for E(K) [l] . It is assumed that l is a prime number, and the characteristic of K is char(K) = 0 or p, where p is relatively prime to l. Then E[l] can be decomposed into a direct sum of two cyclic groups as E[l] ∼ = Z l ⊗ Z l . (See Appendix for a mini example) Let G, H be some fixed generating pair for E[l]. Then any point in E[l] can be expressed by these generating points G and
. For some fixed integers α, β ∈ [0, l − 1], the following function is defined:
The trivial case where both α, β are zero has been excluded.
Let G 1 , G 2 , and G 3 be three Abelian groups. Generally speaking, bilinear pairing is a map e : G 1 × G 2 −→ G 3 among these three groups, and the map must satisfy the bilinear property as follows:
The next theorem shows that the function L α,β is indeed bilinear pairing. Theorem 1 ([16] ). The function L α,β has the following properties:
Bilinearity
For all P, Q, R ∈ E[l], L α,β (P + Q, R) = L α,β (P, R) + L α,β (Q, R) and L α,β (P, Q + R) = L α,β (P, Q) + L α,β (P, R).
Anti-symmetry
For all P, Q ∈ E[l], L α,β (P, Q) = −L α,β (Q, P).
Non-degeneracy
The pairing L α,β is called self-pairing because it maps E[l] × E[l] to E[l] (compared with traditional Weil-pairing and Tate-pairing).
The next lemma tells when the value of the self-pairing will be the zero-element with a given point. This lemma will be used in the security analysis of the new scheme described in Section 3. Lemma 1. If α · β = 0, then all the points P such that L α,β (P, Q) = O for a given point Q = O are the set {kQ : 0 ≤ k < l}.
Proof. Let
Q = aG + bH, P = cG + dH. Then O = L α,β (P, Q) = (ad − bc)(αG + βH) if and only if ad − bc ≡ 0 (mod l), which is equivalent to P ∈ {kQ : 0 ≤ k < l}.
The new scheme of sharing points on an elliptic curve
This section presents the proposed scheme on sharing multiple points {M 1 , M 2 , . . . , M m } ⊆ E[l]. They can be viewed as messages embedded in points or can be used as crypto-keys.
Initial phase (only once)
Without loss of generality, the researchers assume that there is a trusted dealer, denoted by D, and n participants,
Here, a public bulletin is required for the trusted dealer to publish public information. The dealer can use the following steps to set up the parameters of the sharing scheme.
1. The Dealer(D) chooses an elliptic curve E over GF(q), where q = p r , p is a large enough prime for both the discrete logarithm in GF(q) and the ECDLP in E(GF(q)) are hard. D then chooses a large prime l such that E[l] ⊆ E(GF(q k )) for some small integer k (which can be viewed as a constant in comparison to q).
D chooses a generating pair {G, H} ∈ E[l]
and integers α, β ∈ [1, l − 1], which determine the pairing L α,β . 3. Finally, D publishes {E, q, l, k, αG + βH} in the public bulletin.
Shadows distribution (only once)
The dealer can use the following steps to distribute the shadows to these n participants, such that any t or more participants can easily reconstruct the shared points, while any t − 1 or fewer participants cannot.
D computes matrix A as:
3. D computes (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) T = A · ( a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a t ) T ,
Points sharing
After distributing the shadows, the dealer can share points among these n participants by following these steps:
1. For share m different points, say {M 1 , M 2 , . . . , M m }, the dealer, D, chooses c i , d i ∈ [0, l − 1] randomly and computes
D computes
R i = L α,β (Q i , P t ) + M i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and then publishes {c i , d i , R i } 1≤i≤m in the public bulletin.
Points reconstruction
We assume that t distinct users, say {U u 1 , U u 2 , . . . , U ut }, want to reconstruct the m points {M i } 1≤i≤m . The reconstructing procedure is as follows:
For each i form 1 to m:
Each of them computes
T i = t j=1 y j Q i,j , where y j = ( t J=1,J =j (u j − u J )) −1 .
Each of them downloads point R i from the public bulletin and recovers M i as
R i − T i .
Analyses and discussion
Correctness
From the shadow distribution phase of the proposed scheme one can see that
where means that the corresponding term is omitted and [Q(X)] s−1 is the coefficient of X s−1 in the polynomial Q(X) [17] .
In particular, from the t-th row of M −1 , one arrives at the following equation:
This implies that the points sharing scheme is correct.
Security analysis
This section examines the security of the proposed scheme in the following and points out that the new multi-point sharing scheme is computationally secure if at least n − t + 1 users in the scheme are honest and at most O(lg q) points are shared. Theorem 2. If at least n − t + 1 users are honest then any t − 1 users know nothing about P t .
Proof. Any t − 1 users, say {U
The rank of B is t − 1 (in fact, the first t − 1 columns of B form a Vandermonde matrix). From the theory of linear equations, a t can be any value in [0, l − 1]. The same result holds true to b t . Therefore any t − 1 users know nothing about P t .
Theorem 3. Without knowing the point P t , the probability of choosing a point P ∈ E [l] at random such that
The theorems above imply that the probability of any t − 1 users recovering a single point M i is not more than 1/l.
In a multi-point sharing scheme, the reconstruction of one point must not compromise the secrecy of the remaining points that have not been reconstructed. The next two theorems prove this inference.
Proof. Assume that there exists an algorithm A which can compute integers {m
} and a given point Q. Then especially for points {Q i } ⊆ G , Q ∈ G , and P ∈ H , the algorithm A can compute integers {m i } such that L α,β (Q, P t ) = i m i L α,β (Q i , P t ), and thus Q = i m i Q i , which is in conflict to the second assumption.
Proof. Assume that there exists an algorithm A which can compute integers a and b such that P t = aG + bH from the O(lg q) pairs of points {Q i , L α,β (Q i , P t )}. Then especially for any point P ∈ G , the algorithm A can compute integer a such that P t = aG (b = 0) by randomly choosing O(lg q) points Q i ∈ E[l] and computing L α,β (Q i , P t ). However, based from the first assumption, this is impossible. Therefore, such an algorithm A does not exist.
In reality, no system can share infinite secrets. On the other hand, the aforementioned two theorems show that the multi-point sharing scheme proposed in this paper is secure in computation when O(lg q) points are shared.
Conclusion
This paper proposed a new (t, n) multi-point sharing scheme, in which m points can be shared among n participants, and t or more participants can co-operate to reconstruct these secrets; however, any (t − 1) or fewer participants can derive nothing about these points. The researchers proved that the proposed scheme is computationally secure under the assumption that ECDLP is hard. Using this points sharing scheme, cryptographic threshold schemes, such as the threshold signature scheme and group signature scheme, can be designed and implemented easily.
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Appendix. A mini example
The elliptic curve is E/GF (5) : y 2 = x 3 + 3x + 4. Let GF(5 2 ) = GF (5) [α]/(α 2 + α + 1), then #E(GF(5 2 )) = 27 and the eight (finite) 3-torsion points are as follows: (−1, ±(α + 3)), (2, ±2), (α, ±α), (4α + 4, ±(α + 1)). By letting G = (2, 2) and H = (α, α), E[l] can be expressed as the linear combination of G and H as follows: O = 0G + 0H, (2, 2) = 1G + 0H, (2, −2) = 2G + 0H, (0, α) = 0G + 1H, (4 + 4α, 1 + α) = 1G + 1H, (−1, −α − 3) = 2G + 1H, (α, −α) = 0G + 2H, (−1, α + 3) = 1G + 2H, and (4 + 4α, 4 + 4α) = 2G + 2H, which give the isomorphism between E [3] and Z 3 ⊗ Z 3 .
